We discuss the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in the light of quantum algorithmic information. While Shannon's information theory needs a probability to define a notion of information, algorithmic information theory does not need it and can assign a notion of information to an individual object. The program length necessary to describe an object, Kolmogorov complexity, plays the most fundamental role in the theory. In the context of algorithmic information theory, we formulate a security criterion for the quantum key distribution by using the quantum Kolmogorov complexity that was recently defined by Vitányi. We show that a simple BB84 protocol indeed distribute a binary sequence between Alice and Bob that looks almost random for Eve with a probability exponentially close to 1.
II. QUANTUM KOLMOGOROV COMPLEXITY BASED ON CLASSICAL DESCRIPTION
Recently some quantum versions of Kolmogorov complexity were proposed by a several researchers. Svozil [11] , in his pioneering work, defined the quantum Kolmogorov complexity as the minimum classical description length of a quantum state through a quantum Turing machine [12, 13] . As is easily seen by comparing the cardinality of a set of all the programs with that of a set of all the quantum states, the value often becomes infinity. Vitányi's definition [10] , while similar to Svozil's, does not have this disadvantage. He added a term that compensates for the a difference between a target state and an output state. Berthiaume, van Dam, and Laplante [14] defined their quantum Kolmogorov complexity as the length of the shortest quantum program that outputs a target state. The definition was settled and its properties were extensively investigated by Müller [15, 16] . Gacs [17] employed a different starting point related to the algorithmic probability to define his quantum Kolmogorov complexity.
In this paper we employ the definition given by Vitányi [10] . The use of Vitányi's definition is justified for the following reason. Since, as will be seen in the next section, we are interested in the randomness of a classical final key for Eve, to consider its classical description is sufficient even if Eve has a quantum state. This way of thinking is natural in quantum-information theory. That is, when one is interested in classical outputs, the inputs to be considered are also classical. Vitányi gave a description of a one-way quantum Turing machine and utilized it to define a prefix quantum Kolmogorov complexity. A one-way quantum Turing machine consists of four tapes and an internal control. (See [10] for more details.) Each tape is a one-way infinite qubit chain and has a corresponding head on it. One of the tapes works as the input tape and is read-only from left-to-right. A program is given on this tape as an initial condition. The second tape works as the work tape. The work tape is initially set to be 0 for all the cells. The head on it can read and write a cell and can move in both directions. The third tape is called an auxiliary tape. One can put an additional input on this tape. The additional input is written to the leftmost qubits and can be a quantum state or a classical state. This input is needed when one treats conditional Kolmogorov complexity. The fourth tape works as the output tape. It is assumed that after halting the state of this tape will not be changed. The internal control is a quantum system described by a finite-dimensional Hilbert space which has two special orthogonal vectors |q 0 (initial state) and |q f (halting state). After each step one makes a measurement of a coarse-grained observable {|q f q f |, 1 − |q f q f |} on the internal control to know if the computation halts. Although there are subtle problems [18, 19, 20, 21] in the halting process of the quantum Turing machine, we do not get into this problem and employ a simple definition of the halting. A computation halts at time t if and only if the probability to observe q f at time t is one, and at any time t ′ < t a probability to observe q f is zero. By using this one-way quantum Turing machine, Vitányi defined the quantum Kolmogorov complexity as follows. He treated the length of the shortest classical description of a quantum state. That is, the programs of the quantum Turing machine are restricted to classical ones. While the programs must be classical, the auxiliary inputs can be quantum states. We write U (p, y) = |x if and only if a quantum Turing machine U with a classical program p and an auxiliary (classical or quantum) input y halts and outputs |x . The following is the precise description of Vitányi's definition.
Definition 1 [10] The (self-delimiting) quantum Kolmogorov complexity of a pure state |x with respect to a one-way quantum Turing machine U with y (possibly a quantum state) as conditional input given for free is
where l(p) is the length of a classical program p, and ⌈a⌉ is the smallest integer larger than a.
The one-way quality of the quantum Turing machine ensures that the halting programs compose a prefix-free set. Because of this, the length l(p) is defined consistently. The term ⌈− log 2 | z|x | 2 ⌉ represents how insufficiently an output |z approximates the desired output |x . This additional term has a natural interpretation using the ShannonFano code. Vitányi has shown the following invariance theorem, which is very important.
Theorem 1 [10] There is a universal quantum Turing machine U , such that for all machines Q there is a constant c Q , such that for all quantum states |x and all auxiliary inputs y we have
Thus the value of the quantum Kolmogorov complexity does not depend on the choice of the quantum Turing machine if one neglects the unimportant constant term c Q . Thanks to this theorem, one often writes K instead of K U . Moreover, the following theorem is crucial for our discussion.
Theorem 2 [10] On classical objects (that is, finite binary strings that are all directly computable) the quantum Kolmogorov complexity coincides up to a fixed additional constant with the self-delimiting Kolmogorov complexity. That is, there exists a constant c such that for any classical binary sequence |x ,
holds.
According to this theorem, for classical objects it essentially suffices to treat only programs that exactly output the object.
III. SECURITY PROOF OF QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION IN THE LIGHT OF QUANTUM ALGORITHMIC INFORMATION
A. Security of one-time pad
The goal of the quantum key distribution is to distribute a secret key only between legitimate users. In the context of algorithmic information, a secret key is nothing but a binary sequence that looks random to Eve. We first show that a random binary sequence shared only by Alice and Bob does work for secure communication thereafter. Suppose that Alice and Bob share a common binary sequence k ∈ {0, 1} M . Eve does not know the sequence except for its length. That is, the uncertainty of k for Eve is K(k|M ). Suppose that Alice sends a message x ∈ {0, 1}
M to Bob by one-time pad. That is, Alice sends a binary sequence x ⊕ k ∈ {0, 1} M which is known also by Eve. Bob, who knows k, can decode it easily to obtain x. In addition, if k is not random, its short description enables Eve to reproduce x from any given x ⊕ k. Moreover, we can show the following.
Theorem 3 There exists a constant c (that depends only on a choice of a quantum Turing machine) such that the following statement holds. Let M be an arbitrary positive integer and let k ∈ {0, 1}
M be a binary sequence. For any δ > 0, we define a set B δ ⊂ {0, 1}
M as
The size of this B δ is bounded by
The following corollary is obvious.
Corollary 1 There exists a constant c such that the following statement holds. Let M be an arbitrary positive integer and let k ∈ {0, 1} M be a binary sequence that looks random to Eve, who knows its length only. That is, K(k|M ) ≥ M holds. For any δ > 0, we define a set B δ ⊂ {0, 1}
The size |B δ | in this corollary is thus much smaller than |{0, 1} M | = 2 M . This corollary shows that, if Alice and Bob share a random binary sequence only between them, they can achieve a secret communication by one-time pad.
Let us note a remark. One may wonder whether one can show that the size of a set {x|K(x|x ⊕ k, M ) ≤ M − c} is exponentially small compared with |{0,
It is not possible because many x's have a small Kolmogorov complexity even if Eve does not know x ⊕ k. For instance, the Kolmogorov complexity of x = 00 . . . 00 ∈ {0, 1} M is almost vanishing. Thus even |{x|K(x|M ) ≤ M −c}| can be comparable with 2
(1−δ)M holds for c ≥ 0.
B. BB84 protocol
As was discussed in the last section, if Alice and Bob share a binary sequence that is random for Eve, they can communicate securely by using the sequence. Our goal in the following is to show that a quantum key distribution indeed achieves this distribution of a random binary sequence. In this section, a concrete protocol to be analyzed is introduced. We consider a quantum key distribution protocol that uses a preshared secret key for error correction and uses a public linear code for privacy amplification. Although there are more sophisticated or realistic ones, we treat one of the simplest protocols since our aim is to present a different viewpoint from the algorithmic information. Let us introduce the protocol.
(i) Alice encodes a probabilistically [22] chosen 2N bit classical sequence to a quantum state of 2N -qubits with respect to a probabilistically [22] chosen basis b ∈ {+, ×} 2N .
(ii) After confirming Bob's receipt of all the sent qubits, Alice announces the basis b. Bob makes a measurement with the basis b on his qubits to obtain an outcome.
(iii) Alice probabilistically [22] chooses half the number of 2N bits T ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , 2N } (|T | = N ), which are called test bits. The remaining bits I := {1, 2, . . . , 2N } \ T are called information bits. Alice announces T and the classical sequence z T ∈ {0, 1} N which was encoded to the test bits.
(iv) Alice and Bob check the error rate in the test bits by public discussions. If the error rate is larger than a preagreed threshold p, they abort the protocol.
(v) Alice and Bob perform an error correction by the one-time pad using a preshared secret key. They consume N h(p) + const secret bits for this procedure. 
N which span a linear code C. The vectors could be announced before the whole protocol. Its Hamming distance d(C) = min{|v| : v = 0, v ∈ C} is assumed to satisfy d(C) > 2N (p + ǫ), where p is the allowed error rate in test bits and ǫ > 0 is a small security parameter. The final key is obtained from the sifted key by a function f : {0, 1} N → {0, 1} M which is defined as
Eve's purpose is to obtain knowledge of f (x).
C. Security proof
Suppose that Alice has chosen a basis b ∈ {0, 1} 2N , test bits T , a value of the test bits z T ∈ {0, 1} N , and Bob has obtained z
N as the value of the test bits. After (v) in the above protocol Eve also knows all of them. As is well-known, one can view the protocol also from an Ekert 1991 protocol (E91) like setting. In the E91 like setting, after the error correction there is an entangled state over Alice's information bits, Bob's information bits and Eve's apparatus. We denote the state as ρ b,T,zT ,z ′ T . Alice makes a measurement X A = {|x x|} on her information bits to obtain a sifted key x ∈ {0, 1} N . This measurement changes the state on Bob's information bits and Eve's apparatus [24] . We denote the a posteriori state on Bob's information bit and Eve's apparatus as ρ x,b,T,zT ,z ′ T . We further write its restriction on Eve's apparatus as ρ Theorem 4 There exists a constant c (that depends only on the choice of the quantum Turing machine) such that the following statement holds. For any N , any p, any ǫ > 0, any independent vectors {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v M } whose span C satisfies d(C) > 2N (p + ǫ), and any δ > 0,
Proof:
We fix a universal quantum Turing machine U and discuss the values of the quantum Kolmogorov complexity with respect to it. Since f (x) is classical, to discuss the quantum Kolmogorov complexity of f (x) it essentially suffices to consider programs that exactly output f (x) thanks to Theorem 2. For each output x ∈ {0, 1} M , there is a shortest program t x,b,T,zT ,z ′ T (take an arbitrary one if it is not unique) that produces f (x) exactly as its output with auxiliary inputs ρ 
where H A is the Hilbert space for the auxiliary input and H I is the Hilbert space for programs and H O = ⊗ M C 2 is the Hilbert space for outputs, and Σ(H) denotes the set of all the density operators on H.
For a while we proceed with our analysis for fixed b, T, z T , z 
If we consider Alice's measurement X A = {|x x|} on her information bits and denote by p(x|b, T, z T , z ′ T ) the probability to obtain x, it is represented as t∈L y x∈E
where we have used the condition (1). In addition, this quantity can be represented in a different form (see Appendix C for its proof).
Lemma 1 Suppose that Alice virtually makes a measurement on her information bits with a PVM Z A := {|z z|} which is conjugate to X A = {|x x|} that is actually measured to obtain a sifted key, and Bob virtually makes a measurement on his information bits with Z B := {|z z|} which is conjugate to X B that is actually measured. We denote their outcomes z I and z
where the second term in the right hand side is the square root of the probability to obtain distant z I and z ′ I with respect to a state ρ b,T,zT ,z ′ T .
Combining these different expressions (2) and (3), we obtain
Now if L is taken as L := {t| l(t) ≤ M − δN }, since |L| ≤ 2 M−δN holds the above inequality can be rewritten as
Thanks to Theorem 2, there exists a constant c such that, if x satisfies K(f (x)|ρ
We multiply both sides of this inequality by p(b, T, z T , z ′ T ) which is defined as the probability to obtain b, T, z T , z 
The second term of the right hand side is bounded by Hoeffding's lemma as Pr(|z I ⊕ z
2 N (see e.g. [5] ). We thus obtain
This ends the proof. Q.E.D.
IV. DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, we considered the security of the quantum key distribution protocol in the light of quantum algorithmic information. We employed the quantum Kolmogorov complexity defined by Vitányi as the fundamental quantity, discussed a possible security criterion, and showed that the simple BB84 protocol satisfies it. According to the main theorem, a probability for Eve to obtain an almost random final key is exponentially close to 1. The length of the final keys M is determined by a condition for the Hamming distance. One can take it as M ≃ N (1 − h(2(p + ǫ))). Since the legitimate users have consumed N h(p + ǫ) bits for the error correction, the length of the key produced amounts to N (1 − h(2(p + ǫ)) − h(p + ǫ)). It coincides with the rate obtained in [5] where the security criterion was based on Shannon's information theory.
Although we hope that the present work can be a first step toward the study of quantum cryptography from the viewpoint of quantum algorithmic information, there still remain a lot of things to be investigated. The security criterion employed in this paper utilizes the quantum Kolmogorov complexity, but it still needs the probability. Therefore, the original motivation of the algorithmic information theory, in some sense, has not been perfectly accomplished. Comparison between security notions based on algorithmic information and Shannon's information is an important future problem to be considered. While the simple BB84 protocol satisfies both criteria, it is not clear whether one can be derived from another in some sense. The relation between these criteria will become more subtle if we will deepen our algorithmic information theoretical discussion so as to avoid an appearance of probability completely. For instance, as was shown, in the one-time pad protocol, while an individual secret key cannot be discussed in the conventional Shannon's information theory, it can be treated in the algorithmic information theory. In addition, as we noted in Sec. II, there are some other definitions of quantum Kolmogorov complexity. It is interesting to investigate whether one can apply them to the security problem. Application of our argument to other protocols will be another interesting problem.
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APPENDIX A: TECHNICAL LEMMAS Lemma 2 . For any state ρ and any projection operators Q and P , it holds that |tr(ρQ) − tr(P QP )| ≤ 3tr(ρ(1 − P )) 1/2 .
Proof: Since 1 = P + (1 − P ) holds, Q can be decomposed as Q = 1Q1 = P QP + P Q(1 − P ) + (1 − P )QP + (1 − P )Q(1 − P ).
Thus we obtain |tr(ρQ) − tr(ρP QP )| ≤ |tr(ρP Q(1 − P ))| + |tr(ρ(1 − P )QP )| + |tr(ρ(1 − P )Q(1 − P ))|.
The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality bounds the first term in the right-hand side as |tr(ρP Q(1 − P ))| = tr(ρP QP ) 1/2 tr(ρ(1 − P )) 1/2 ≤ tr(ρ(1 − P )) 1/2 .
Other terms can be bounded in a similar manner. This ends the proof. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 For given linearly independent vectors {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v M } ⊂ {0, 1} N , we define f : {0, 1} N → {0, 1} M as f (x) = (x · v 1 , x · v 2 , . . . , x · v M ). Let C be a code generated by {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v M } and d(C) be its Hamming distance. For s, t ∈ {0, 1} N satisfying |s|, |t| < For s ⊕ t ∈ C, it gives 2 N −M (−1) wy·(s⊕t) . Since |s ⊕ t| ≤ |s| + |t| < d(C) holds, s ⊕ t ∈ C means s = t. For s ⊕ t / ∈ C, thanks to Lemma D.1 in [5] , 
